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This paper applies a discrete choice model to determine specific characteristics that 
influence South African grain farmers’ preferences to hedge against uncertainties. 
This is the first empirical study on South African grain producers’ preferences to 
adopt derivative contracting and is based on the survey data of Grain South Africa for 
2006. With the application of separate binary logit models for each major grain 
commodity, this paper establishes that different grain farmers are significantly 
heterogeneous. The results also show that grain farmers’ preferences to adopt 
derivative contracting are mostly influenced by the farmers’ prediction of daily grain 
prices and trends, farm size and various geographic characteristics. From a policy 
perspective it has been indicated that food and income insecurity will be reduced if 
farmers can adopt derivative contracting at large scale since it will enable the 
producers to produce staple food on a continuous basis at a relatively profitable level. 
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Prior to 1996, the South African grain industry was inwardly focused and 
heavily influenced by regulations and government control. With the 
deregulation of the grain industry, prices of grain products are, however, free 
to move according to national, as well as international, supply and demand 
considerations, leading to production, marketing and processing decisions 
based on market signals and not government interventions (Vink & Kirsten, 
2000; Meyer 2005).  
 
Following the deregulation of the grain industry, producers also lost their 
collective bargaining power since the former agricultural co-operatives 
changed in the business scope. This, together with decreasing producers’ 
prices, increasing input costs and uncertainties in grain producer prices, 
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negatively affected the producers’ ability to sustain profitability over the 
longer term (Department of Agriculture, 2004; Department of Agriculture, 
2005; Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy Research, 2005; Grain South 
Africa, 2005; Van Zyl, 2006). Therefore, risk management plays a vital role for 
the individual producer to reduce market uncertainties and consequently 
liquidity constraints. 
 
To offer buyers and sellers a hedge against price uncertainty, risk management 
instruments (derivatives) were developed (Geyser, 2006). The South African 
Futures Exchange (“SAFEX”), which forms part of the JSE Securities Exchange, 
introduced the trading of derivatives (futures and options) for grain products 
in 1998. The trading of derivatives encourages increased productivity in the 
agricultural sector as farmers and users are able to concentrate their efforts on 
managing production risks. These are the risks associated with variables such 
as the weather, farm/production management and seasonal conditions. As a 
result, derivative contractual arrangements may be preferred to the spot or 
cash transactions.  
 
To date, however, very little attention has been paid to the South African grain 
producers’ risk perceptions and risk attitudes, as well as their empirical 
measurement, and this paper attempts to enhance the South African grain 
producers’ decision-making behaviour towards risk reduction. In essence, this 
analysis tries to close this gap by using a logit model and micro-level data to 
analyse farmers’ market behaviour in managing uncertainties in the market. 
These results are important for policy considerations to combat income 
insecurity and to improve producers’ abilities to manage uncertainties within 
the so-called “free market” environment.  
 
This analysis has three objectives. The first objective is to identify specific 
characteristics influencing grain farmers’ preferences to adopt derivative 
contracts. Second, to highlight the differences between farmers’ risk 
preferences in the production of white maize, yellow maize and wheat. Third, 
to enhance the understanding of independent grain producers’ decision-
making behaviour with the application of the research results of this paper. To 
obtain the set objectives, this paper has four components: First, a literature 
review on contract theory, in the agricultural context, with an application of 
discrete choice modelling. Second, the theoretical framework of the empirical 
model employed in this analysis is developed. The third components relates to 
the analysis of the data used, followed by the interpretation of the empirical 
results.  
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2.  Related studies  
 
This section provides an overview of alternative empirical approaches used in 
previous international studies will be reviewed. This is done to seek guidance 
from the international studies for application within a South African 
environment since similar studies are rare.  
 
Table 1 provides a list of some of the more important and relevant studies 
identifying characteristics that might be responsible for the choice of utilising a 
derivative contract in the agricultural industry. These studies are all based on 
survey data and maximum likelihood econometric estimation and revealed 
that farmers’ preference is a function of their specific socio-economic 
circumstances.  
 
Table 1: International studies based on maximum likelihood econometric 
estimation on farmer’s behaviour to adopt derivative contracts 
Discrete choice model  Study 
Asplund et al. (1989) 
Edelman et al. (1990) 
Schnitkey et al. (1992) 
McLeay & Zwart (1998) 
Logit model 
Mishra & Perry (1999) 
Multinominial logit model  Sartwelle et al. (2000) 
Shapiro & Brorsen (1988) 
Tobit model 
Musser et al. (1996) 
Probit  & Tobit models  Goodwin & Schroeder (1994) 
Tobit , Poisson  & multinominial logit models  Katchova & Miranda (2004) 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Most of studies established that age, as a proxy for experience, has an 
insignificant, negative association towards the hedging adoption (Fletcher & 
Terza, 1986; Asplund et al., 1989; Edelman et al., 1990; Shapiro & Brorsen, 1988; 
Musser et al., 1996; Katchova & Miranda, 2004). Shapiro and Brorsen (1988), 
along with Musser et al. (1996), suggested that one explanation of this result is 
that a more experienced farmer has the ability to effectively use the spot 
market. In contrast, Katchova and Miranda (2004) find that an older farmer is 
significantly more likely to adopt derivative contracting relative to spot 
market transactions.  
 
Similarly, most of the studies established that education, including training in 
the derivatives market, has a significant, positive association towards hedging 
adoption (Fletcher & Terza, 1986; Goodwin & Schroeder, 1994; Musser et al., 
1996; Katchova & Miranda, 2004). However, Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) found 
the opposite. In this regard, the authors suggested that this result is consistent 
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with the human capital theory, where risk aversion decreases with increases in 
education and experience. 
 
Mishra and Perry (1999), as well as Sartwelle et al. (2000), included regional 
dummies to account for factors such as climate variables, yield expectations 
and production patterns. These studies obtained a significant, positive 
association towards hedging adoption with respect to these variables. 
Similarly, Goodwin and Schroeder (1994), Musser et al. (1996), Mishra and 
Perry (1999), Sartwelle et al. (2000), as well as Katchova and Miranda (2004), 
established that larger farms are more likely to hedge against uncertainties.  
 
Edelman  et al. (1990), McLeay and Zwart (1998), as well as Sartwelle et al. 
(2000), suggested that farm diversification is measured by the percentage 
revenue from grain as a percentage of total revenue. These studies established 
that the greater the percentage of farm area devoted to a particular grain, the 
more likely it is for the farmer to participate in contracting, since their 
exposure to price fluctuations increase. Fletcher and Terza (1986), Asplund et 
al. (1989), Schnitkey et al. (1992), as well as Katchova and Miranda (2004), all 
reported that access to advisory services and information has a significant, 
positive association towards the adoption of derivative contracts to hedge 
against uncertainties. Within the South African market, a grain producer can 
either obtain information from associations, such as Grain South Africa and 
South African Grain Information Services (SAGIS), other market players or via 
the media. Furthermore, Asplund et al. (1989) and Mishra and Perry (1999) 
concluded that the adoption of new technology, such as computers and the 
internet, increases the likelihood to adopt derivative contracting.  
 
Most of the studies reviewed treated producers as homogenous regarding the 
producers’ use of derivative contracts2. In other words, these authors pooled 
the data across various agricultural products as if the data were collected from 
a single population. Pennings and Leuthold (2000) suggested that this 
assumption of homogeneity is unrealistic as farmers, producing different 
commodities, use different attributes when deciding to adopt derivative 
contracting. Therefore, this paper takes the heterogeneity of grain farmers into 
account by analysing the effects of South African grain farmers’ characteristics 
on their preferences to hedge against uncertainties for each main grain crop, 
respectively.  
 
In the subsequent sections a theoretical model is developed, followed by the 
data used as well as the empirical model and results. 
                                                 
2 See Asplund et al. (1989); Edelman et al. (1990); Schnitkey (1992); Goodwin and Schroeder (1994); McLeay 
and Zwart (1998); Mishra and Perry (1999); Musser et al. (1996), as well as Sartwelle et al. (2000). 
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3. Theoretical  framework 
 
Here the authors assume that producers can state their preferences between 
derivative contracts and spot market transactions. Underlying this assumption 
is the fact that the producers are expected to rationally reveal their preference 
in line with the objective of improving their welfare. Therefore, to design a 
theoretical model, this paper considers a utility maximisation problem for a 
grain farmer’s preference in the decision-making process to use derivative 
contracts.  
 
Amemiya (1981), Greene (1993) and Verbeek (2000) stated that discrete 
models, which are strongly linked to utility theory, have been widely used in 
economics to investigate factors affecting an individual’s choice from among 
two or more alternatives. In the context of agricultural production, some of the 
reviewed studies modelled the decision-making process as a utility 
maximisation problem for producers (see, for example, Goodwin & Schroeder, 
1994; Mishra & Perry, 1999; Katchova & Miranda, 2004).  
 
Based on economic theory, producers will always prefer to participate in the 
derivatives market if it maximises their profit, subject to their constraints 
(Bekele, 2004). Accordingly, Mishra and Perry (1999) represented producers’ 
profit function as follows:  
 
] [ ) 1 ( i i i i i i i q q q r q f δ ρλ α γ λ λ π + + + − − + =       ( 1 )  
 
where f represents the price received with a derivative (futures or options) 
contract; r is the spot price; q is the output of the grain crop; λ  (1-λ ) ( 1 0 ≤ ≤λ ) 
is the proportion of the grain crop sold in the derivatives market (with the 
balance sold in the spot market); γ  is the total fixed production cost;  q α  is the 
variable cost component and; δ  and  q ρ  are the fixed cost and variable cost 
components associated with derivative contracts and spot transactions3.  
 
From equation 1, Brusset (2005) explained that another key difference between 
spot market usage and derivate contracts is that the spot market entails higher 
transaction costs to the producer due to information gathering, service quality 
and price discovery.  
 
Mishra and Perry (1999) further stated that profits are stochastic, since output 
and prices are random variables. As such, a Taylor’s series expansion of 
equation 1, under the assumption that the producers are risk averse ( i ϑ ), 
                                                 
3 These costs include information-gathering expenses, commissions or brokerage fees. 
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implies an expected utility of profits function with observable variables in 
terms of its mean (μ ) and variance ( ).  
2 σ
 
) , , ( ) (
2
i i i f EU ϑ σ μ π =           ( 2 )  
 
Willock et al. (1999) acknowledged that farmers’ behaviour is not only driven 
by the maximisation of profit, rather it is the result of a complex process that is 
affected by several socio-economic and psychological variables.  
 
In light of this, upon maximising the expected utility profits (equation 2), 
Mishra and Perry (1999) found an expression relating to the producers’ 
preference to participate in the derivatives market. The expression can be 
related to a set of observable producer and socio-economic characteristics (X), 
the coefficient vector (β ) and the residual error (ε ).  
 
i i i i X g ε β λ + = ) (          ( 3 )  
 
Notably, McFadden (1973) acknowledges that the residual error term 
represents heterogeneity across a producer’s preferences, once the observable 
variables have been taken into account. Since λ  is unobservable, the authors 
applied discrete choice models with λ =1 if the farmer participates in hedging 
and  λ =0, otherwise. In other words, the authors assumed a dichotomous 
nature of the dependent variable. In addition, Verbeek (2000) and Bekele 
(2004) maintained that with appropriate distributional assumptions on the 
error terms, the approach leads to a manageable expression for probabilities 
implied by the model. 
 
Under this model specification, a standard logistical distribution of the error 
terms is assumed. The standard logistical distribution has a mean ofμ =0 and a 
variance of  , and is symmetric around its zero mean. To overcome 
the concern of endogeneity bias, this application further assumes that there is 
no correlation between the error terms.  
3 /
2 2 π σ =
 
This particular model applies a logistic regression, where the farmers’ decision 
is assumed to be of a dichotomous nature. This paper also incorporates the 
differences between farmers’ hedging preferences for each major grain 
product. To this effect, this paper creates subsamples based on the major grain 
products; namely, white maize, yellow maize and wheat.  
 
The discrete dependent variable is defined as the producer’s preference to 
hedge against uncertainties (to participate in the derivative market), 
conditional on demographic and sociological factors. 
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= i n λ             (4)                     1, hedge against uncertainties in grain product n, if 
 
  
n λ >0 
 
0, prefer spot market for grain product n, otherwise 
where n= {white maize, yellow maize, wheat} 
 
In essence, each producer indicates a preference between two alternatives. The 
producer can either hedge against the uncertainties in the market (in other 
words adopt derivative contracting) or make use of the spot market 
transactions. A stochastic utility is associated with each alternative and the 
producers choose the one with which the utility is highest. The logistic 
distribution of the random variables, which describe the valuations of 
alternatives, expresses the distribution of the producers’ preferences.  
 
The subsequent sections show the data used in this paper and the empirical 
results obtained.  
 
4.  Summary of data used  
 
It was only as recent as in 2006 that Grain South Africa (Grain SA) conducted a 
survey across the grain growing regions that provides a sufficiently large set 
of individual observations, with a large degree of standardisation that allows 
for a study of this kind (Grain South Africa, 2006a). At the end of 2006, Grain 
SA granted the authors permission to use this dataset. 
 
The dataset contains 517 observations and comprises data from a random 
sample across all the grain growing regions and is representative of the 
general grain producers’ population. A 13-page questionnaire, compiled by 
the Genesis group, was used to collect information within each grain growing 
region with individual interviews. The questionnaire covers issues such as 
personal characteristics of the producer, farm characteristics, income 
dependency, biofuel possibilities, access to information sources, the market 
environment and producer’s preference to hedge against uncertainties.  
 
Though the initial objective of this survey was to assess the need for service 
delivery among the South African grain producers and the current degree of 
satisfaction with the service delivery of the association, Grain South Africa, to 
South African grain producers the survey also fits the objective of this paper.  
 
The dependent variable for this paper was obtained from the response to a 
question in the questionnaire where grain producers were asked to state their 
need or preference towards SAFEX contracting. In other words, this variable 
reflects the grain producer’s preference towards derivative contract adoption 
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to hedge against uncertainties. Of the 517 South African grain producers in the 
sample, 421 or 81% reflected a preference to hedge against uncertainties. Based 
on the current sample, the independent variables can be described as follows.  
 
The average age of this sample was 43 years. This group of farmers indicated a 
high degree of willingness to attend training courses in SAFEX. Almost 75% of 
the grain farmers are willing to be trained in the derivatives market. On the 
other hand, only 24% of the South African grain farmers have a good 
relationship with the role players within the grain value chain.  
 
The major grain producing provinces are the Free State, North West, and 
Mpumalanga, jointly accounting for 78% of the domestic annual production of 
grain. Furthermore, 60% of the total grain farmers are situated in these regions 
(Grain South Africa, 2006b). Given the relative importance of the three 
provinces mentioned, this paper will only focus on these. Based on the 
regional characteristics, this sample indicates that the location of the farm can 
provide insight into grain producers’ behaviour towards participation in 
hedging.  
 
This paper used the actual output as a proxy for the farm size. An annual crop 
production smaller than 500 tons is characterised as a small farm, while those 
producing greater than 500 tons are identified as a medium or large farms. 
Small farms are used as the base group. Looking at the producers’ farm size, 
27% of the producers interviewed, with a preference towards derivative 
contract adoption, were situated on small farms.  
 
From this sample it is important to note that multiple observations come from 
single producers and each producer may produce more than one specialty 
crop. For example, from the sample it is evident that almost 80% of the 
producers interviewed, who prefer to hedge against uncertainties, are 
involved in the production of white maize, 60% in the production of yellow 
maize and 38% are involved in the production of wheat. Therefore, 
heteroscedasticity might be a problem within the empirical models.  
 
The sample was relatively dependent on income obtained from grain 
production. This implies that the producers face a high degree of exposure to 
price fluctuations (Edelman et al., 1990; McLeay & Zwart, 1998; Sartwelle et al., 
2000). Another factor that influences a farmer’s preference to hedge against 
risk is the development of biofuel possibilities4 and 96% of the producers 
indicated a need for the development of biofuel possibilities. From the 
                                                 
4 The production of grain for biofuels includes both ethanol and biodiesel. On one hand, ethanol is alcohol and 
can be used in making animal feed or used as a petrol additive to improve engine performance, while biodiesel 
can be used in diesel engines (Who Owns Whom, 2006).  
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producers interviewed, 87% of the producers, who prefer to adopt derivative 
contracting, obtain their information from associations to make their 
marketing decisions. Sixty-four percent of the producers, with a preference to 
hedge against uncertainties, obtain their information from other market 
players and only 27% of these producers obtain their information via the 
media. Most of these producers have access to the internet.  
 
The last set of variables identified are those variables needed to obtain 
predictions around daily grain prices and local, as well as international, 
industry trends. As demand and supply considerations play a major role 
within the said free market environment, this paper is of the view that a 
farmer’s perception regarding daily prices and industry trends may influence 
the adoption of derivative contracting. In this regard, more than 90% of the 
farmers, who prefer to hedge against uncertainties, indicated the need for 
these predictions.  
 





Since farmers’ risk preferences might differ between farmers producing white 
maize and other grain commodities, this section analyses binary logit models 
to elucidate the differences between these grain farmers’ preferences to hedge 
against uncertainties.  
 
A major problem normally encountered when working with the type of data 
used in this paper is heteroscedasticity; in other words, systematic 
relationships among the error terms, rendering inconsistent maximum 
likelihood estimators (Greene, 2000). To correct for the potential problem of 
heteroscedasticity, White’s heteroscedasticity corrected standard error is 
specified, in all the models, to ensure consistency and efficiency of estimators.  
 
In describing the differences between risk preferences for each grain 
commodity, separate models, as defined in equation 4, were estimated for 
white and yellow maize, and wheat producers.  
 
A major benefit in logit modelling is that the model determines the relative 
importance of the independent variables to explain the dichotomous 
dependent variable, whether the independent variables are significant or not. 
It is this benefit that serves the basis to enhance the understanding of 
independent grain producers’ decision-making behaviour. In this regard, 
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Table 2 only shows the log of odds of a farmer’s risk preference for a particular 
grain commodity based on the strongest predictors identified.  
 
The remaining part of this section provides a general discussion on the results 
obtained and examines the influence of each identified variable in more detail.  
 
According to Hensher et al. (2005), Pseudo R2 values between 0.2 and 0.4 are 
extremely good fits. The predictive power (Pseudo R2) of each model is, 
therefore, considered to b e  a  g o o d  f i t .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  e m p i r i c a l  
performance is significant if each grain commodity is analysed separately.  
 
Moreover, it is estimated that white maize farmers have a 69% probability to 
hedge against uncertainties; whereas yellow maize and wheat farmers have a 
probability of 47% and 19%, respectively. This indicates that white maize 
producers face the highest degree of price fluctuations. Importantly, this 
implies that different grain farmers are heterogeneous and not homogenous. 
    
The value of taking heterogeneity into account, as reflected in the results 
obtained in Table 2 is examined, more carefully, below according to each 
variable.  
 
5.1 Regional  geographic  characteristics 
  
Regional geographic characteristics, such as climate variables, yield 
expectations, production patterns and unobserved regional characteristics 
significantly influence a grain farmer’s preference to hedge against 
uncertainties. In particular, relative to the other locations, white maize 
producers located in Mpumalanga are the most likely to adopt derivative 
contracting; in other words, they are 22% more likely (see Mpumalanga, 
Column 1 of Table 2). On the other hand, yellow maize producers located in 
the Free State are most likely to hedge against uncertainties; in other words, 
they are 33% more likely (see Free State, Column 2 of Table 2).  
 
This result is consistent as these regions are the main maize growing regions in 
South Africa. It can, therefore, be argued that the Mpumalanga region is the 
most liquid for white maize and the Free State region the most liquid for 
yellow maize. Conversely, this association is negative for wheat farmers in all 
regions under considerations. For example, North Western wheat farmers are 
almost 16% (significantly) less likely to adopt derivative contracting (see North 
West, Column 3 of Table 2). This result is expected, since wheat is mostly 
grown in the Cape area, which is omitted in our estimation.  
 
  231Agrekon, Vol 47, No 2 (June 2008)    Ueckermann et al. 
 
5.2  Farm sizes  
 
With reference to the influence of farm size (FS_small), the results reported in 
Table 2 further established that larger farms have a greater preference to adopt 
derivative contracting. This implies that the preference to hedge against 
uncertainties increases as the size of the farm increases. As suggested by 
Sartwelle et al. (2000), larger farms have economies of scale in terms of learning 
how to use marketing tools and collecting marketing information.  
 
For example, a white maize farmer situated on a small farm is 18% (see 
FS_small, Column 1 of Table 2) less likely to hedge against uncertainties 
compared to 24% (see FS_small, Column 2 of Table 2) for yellow maize 
producers. This result suggests that these farmers entail higher per-unit cost 
than other grain-growing producers in terms of learning how to use marketing 
tools and collecting marketing information.  
 
Table 2: Results of South African grain farmers’ risk preferences for major 
grain product 






Mpumalanga 1.22***  0.846  -0.768 
   (0.442)  (0.568)  (0.577) 
   [0.222]  [0.208]  [-0.102] 
Free State  1.07***  1.370***  -0.442 
   (0.389)  (0.510)  (0.560) 
   [0.211]  [0.330]  [-0.064] 
North West  0.850**  1.200**  -1.295* 
   (0.433)  (0.570)  (0.688) 
   [0.162]  [0.288]  [-0.157] 
FS_small -0.922*  -1.917***  -0.861* 
   (0.496)  (0.461)  (0.528) 
   [-0.178]  [-0.236]  [-0.146] 
Per_prices 3.102***  2.622***  1.815*** 
   (0.541)  (0.712)  (0.651) 
   [0.292]  [0.280]  [0.183] 
Trends 0.810  0.981  -0.567 
   (0.587)  (0.754)  (0.677) 
   [0.189]  [0.226]  [-0.098] 
Pseudo R2  0.50  0.55  0.55 
Chi-Square 123.66  118.95  126.72 
Log Likelihood  -168.11  -159.57  -144.54 
N   516  516  516 
Pr (prefer hedging)  0.69  0.47  0.19 
Standard errors are reflected in parenthesis  
*(**)[***] significant at 10(5)[1]% level  
Marginal effects reflected in [ ] 
Other variables used in the regression and not reported in the table: age, gender, language, income dependence, 
own_use, labourers, IS_ass, IS_mp, IS_media, internet, biofuel, training, and relation  
The estimated coefficients are presented with robust standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity 
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5.3  Need for price predictions and industry trends  
 
The need for predictions regarding daily grain prices and industry trends 
increases the likelihood to adopt derivative contracting. In particular, the 
results contained in Table 2 report that white maize producers with the need 
for daily price predictions are the most likely to adopt derivate contracting, 
compared to the other grain producers.  
 
These white maize producers are 29% significantly more likely to hedge 
against uncertainties (see Per_prices, Column 1 of Table 2), followed by yellow 
maize producers being 28% (see Per_prices, Column 2 of Table 2) significantly 
more likely and wheat producers being 18% significantly more likely (see 
Per_prices, Column 3 of Table 2). As white maize producers face a higher 
degree of price fluctuation (Geyser, 2006), these results suggested that the 
need for daily prices depends on the underlying commodity’s volatility. 
Therefore, hedging seems to be positively related to the extent that a particular 
grain farmer believes that using derivatives gives them greater freedom for 
business action. This implication is also consistent with the findings of 
Pennings and Leuthold (2000). 
 
In terms of the need for local and international predictions regarding industry 
predictions (Trends), Table 2 shows the following: specifically, yellow maize 
producers’ risk preference is influenced the most, followed by white maize 
farmers. The results, therefore, suggest that these farmers perceive hedging to 
increase, if their awareness and interest in making decisions and taking 
advantage of available information improves. On the other hand, the influence 
on a wheat farmer’s risk preference is negative. This might indicate that the 
industry trends available in the wheat industry are ineffective to enhance 
derivative contracting adopting. These results also indicate that each grain 
commodity is constrained with different industry trends and developments.  
 
The next section of this paper demonstrates the implications of the empirical 
results obtained.  
 
6.  Implication of results 
 
The purpose of this section is to show the importance of the results for policy 
considerations to combat income insecurity and to improve producers’ ability 
to manage uncertainties within the said free market environment. In this 
regard, the implications of the results are as follows: 
  
Differences in producers’ risk perceptions about daily grain prices are found 
to be the most important factor. Thus, efforts to increase grain farmers’ 
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derivative contract adoptions are more likely to be successful if policy 
considerations are directed towards improving the availability of efficient and 
reliable price predictions, as well as, creating a need for all grain farmers to 
use this information. This is expected to increase grain producers’ awareness 
and interest in making decisions and taking advantage of the available 
information.  
 
As a result, a producer’s willingness to participate in the derivative market 
will increase with the effect of reducing their uncertainties. Considering that 
the transaction cost of derivative contracting is also lower than in spot market 
transactions (Brusset, 2005), enhanced participation in the derivative market is 
most likely to reduce a grain farmer’s liquidity constraints.  
 
The second strongest predictor is the need for local and international industry 
trends. This analysis also suggests that there is a lack of industry information, 
especially, for wheat farmers, and, hence, serving as an entry barrier. 
Predictions around industry trends are valuable within the free market 
environment as it makes producers aware of the market and market 
opportunities. This implies that policy considerations should target the supply 
of adequate market information to meet the needs of grain farmers. With 
adequate information regarding industry trends, it is likely to improve the 
ability of the grain producers to manage liquidity constraints.  
 
The results further indicate that producers located on smaller farms are 
significantly less likely to hedge against uncertainties. This result, as suggested 
by Sartwelle et al. (2000), is due to economies of scale associated with larger 
farms. Therefore, to enhance small farmers’ preferences towards derivative 
contract adoption, policies targeting to decrease smaller farmers’ per-unit cost, 
in terms of learning how to use derivative tools and collecting marketing 
information, is likely to be successful.  
 
Geographic characteristics, accounting for climate variables, yield expectations 
and production patterns, are also found to be some of the other the strongest 
predictors affecting a grain farmer’s preference to hedge against uncertainties. 
This suggests that research considering hedging strategies for producers, 
which does not consider geographic characteristics, is inappropriate and, 
consequently, triple the financial burden on grain producers.  
 
Taking heterogeneity into account shows that different groups of farmers have 
different decision structures. This information is valuable, as it improves the 
understanding of different grain producers’ preferences towards derivative 
contract adoption and can assist them in modifying their hedging strategies to 
effectively use derivatives.  
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With the implementation of the suggested policies, it is highly likely that the 
problems of food and income insecurity can be addressed, as the grain 
producers will have the ability to produce South Africa’s staple food on a 




This paper provides insights into the grain producer’s preferences to hedge 
against risk at a time when most grain producers face significant liquidity 
constraints. This paper is unique in the sense that this is the first maximum 
likelihood econometric estimation based on South African survey data, 
analysing the producer’s preferences to adopt derivative contracting.  
 
In addition, the uniqueness of this empirical analysis lies in its separate 
evaluations of the most important grain commodities, in order to account for 
the diversity of preferences. In essence, the analysis is based on contract 
theory, with an application of discrete choice modelling. The paper employs 
binary logit models, based on farm-level data, obtained from the Grain South 
Africa Survey conducted in 2006. The models are also consistent with a 
theoretical framework of a utility maximisation problem for a farmer’s 
decision-making process.  
 
The research results reveal that the strongest predictors influencing the 
likelihood of adopting derivative contracts relative to spot market usage are 
the grain farmers’ need for prediction on daily prices and trends, the 
underlying commodity, farm size and the geographic characteristics. Taking 
heterogeneity into account, the results further show that the strongest 
predictors have different influences on the different grain producers’ 
likelihood to adopt derivative contracting:  
 
(i)  White maize producers, who are located in Mpumalanga, with the need 
for daily price predictions, are found to be the most likely to adopt 
derivate contracting. Conversely, white maize farmers situated on a small 
farm and those with good value chain relationships were less likely to 
adopt derivative contracting.  
 
(ii) Yellow maize farmers, the Free State region is the most liquid for yellow 
maize producers and these producers’ preferences are also influenced by 
predictions on industry trends and farm size, relative to the other grain 
commodities.  
 
(iii)  Wheat producers are overall less likely to hedge against uncertainties 
relative to the other grain producers. This low probability can be 
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attributed to a low need for daily price predictions relative to the other 
commodities, farm size and the negative influence of industry trends.  
 
In light of these results, the following are recommended: 
 
•  Policy considerations should be directed at improving the availability of 
price- and commodity-related information to improve farmers’ efficient 
and reliable price predictions, as well as at creating a need for all grain 
farmers to use this information. Without such data farmers will be 
unable, or unwilling, to use the derivatives market implying the non-
development of this tool; 
•  Policy considerations should target the supply of adequate market 
information to meet the needs of grain farmers. Policymakers should 
aim to develop a decentralised system of providing information, which 
should be transparent and easy to decipher, and ensure that it reaches a 
large number of farmers. Policymakers should also ensure that the 
information is kept updated; 
•  Policymakers should aim at decreasing devise a strategy to decrease 
smaller farmers’ per-unit cost in terms of learning how to use derivative 
tools and collect marketing information by building capacity by 
providing training tools, manuals, and organising workshops. 
Policymakers could also consider developing an easy to use and easy 
access central database with price and commodity information for use 
by the farmer.  
•  Research, considering hedging strategies for producers, should 
prioritise geographic characteristics.  
•  Heterogeneity should be accounted for in econometric analyses. 
 
To conclude, with the implementation of the recommendations, there is a high 
possibility that the problems concerning food and income insecurity will be 
reduced, since the grain producers will have the ability to produce South 
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